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Solimano identifies fundamental economic  of large-scale firms can have both stabilizing and
changes in the last 20 years that have influenced  destabilizing macroeconomic effects, for ex-
the emergence of a new paradigm on economic  ample. If it means getting rid of loss-making
reform. The new orthodoxy on economic reform  public enterprises, it could save scarce govern-
emphasizes smaller government, trade liberaliza-  ment resources. But if the resulting output and
tion, business deregulation and privat!zation,  unemployment costs are socially unsustainable,
macroeconomic austerity, and the role of free  pressure may mount for the government to come
markets for resource allocation and growth.  to the enterprises'  rescue.
After describing diverse country experiences  *  The shift from an economy with controlled
in economic reform, Solimano summarizes his  prices to one in which most prices are market-
findings on key aspects of the design of eco-  determined generally involves a big hike in price
nomic reform programs. Among many findings:  levels. Chile and Mexico illustrate the stubborn-
- Shock treatment (as opposed to the gradual  ness of the inflation that may follow.
approach) requires a strong government with  o  China, Korea, and Chile represent countries
broad social support, as the costs of the policies  that carried out economic reforrn under authori-
are paid upfront and the benefits may take time  tarian governments that postponed political
to accrue. If the program involves protracted  reform to gain political legitimacy from the fruits
social hardship, political support will begin to  of consolidated economic reform. In countries
evaporate and pressure will build for a reversal  where economic and political reform are pursued
of reform.  simultaneously (as in Eastern Europe and
* Impontant choices must be made about the  Russia), fragile democracies with a fragmented
sequence of macroeconomic adjustment and  party system and weak social institutions and
consolidadon and structural reform. Implement-  governnents  do not provide the most favorable
ing tax reform and converting quotas to tariffs  political environment for implementing and
improve the fiscal budget, so they contribute to  consolidating complex and painful economic
macroeconomic stabilization. But premature  reformns.  Under these conditions, governments
financial liberalization, before the budget is  are bound to face the dilemma of either postpon-
balanced and real interest rates are at a reason-  ing economic reform to avert a political crisis or
able level, may lead to financial crisis, as hap-  to backslide in democratization to apply painful
pened in Chile in 1982-83. Massive privatization  economic policies - both unsavory choices.
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References  481.  Introduction
Economic Reform is becoming a household word.  It is used to describe
the current attempts of transforming the structure and institutions of whole
economic systems, in a wide variety of countries and contexts.  Economic
reform programs have been, or are currently being undertaken, in Latin America
by countries like Chile, Mexico, Bolivia and very recently in Argentina.
Post-socialist Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are also embarking
in radical programs of economic reform that combine macroeconomic
stabilization with liberalization policies.  In the context of industrialized
countries, the drive to free market economic reform gained impetus in the
1980s with the Thatcherist experiment in England and Reaganomics in the United
States.
Clearly some common currents in policy formulation are permeating many
countries, that not so long ago followed very dissimilar economic strategies;
the most obvious case being the economies of the former socialist block.  The
new orthodoxy on economic reform places strong emphasis on the role of free
markets  for resource allocation and growth, smaller government, trade
liberalization, business deregulation and privatization.  In addition,
macroeconomic austerity is seen as a prerequisite for implementation of these
more structural reforms.
Evidently the new paradigm represents a sharp departure from previous
development strategies in non-socialist developing countries based on state
dirigism, controlled trade regimes and regulated markets for goods and
factors.  The departure is even more striking in the former socialist block
where the institutions of capitalism are absent, key markets work poorly
and/or simply do not exist and the state is the main owner of physical
productive wealth in the country.
This paper has several purposes.  First, it identifies some fundamental
changes in the world economy in the last two decades or so that have
influenced the emergence of a new paradigm on economic reform (section 2).
Then, it discusses several issues of the design of programs of market-oriented
reform combining macroeconomic restraint with liberalization.  In particular2
the discussion focuses on the issue of: (i) intensity of the programs  (shock
treatment vs. gradualism); (ii) the potential conflicts between macroeconomic
consolidation and rapid liberalization; (iii) performance indicators related
to the speed of disinflation, the recessionary-stagnationist  impact of the
programs and their distributive effect (section 3).
Then the paper turns to several experiences with economic reform in
developing market economies and in former socialist countries.  The Latin
American experience of the last two decades with countries combining macro
stabilization and liberalization is reviewed.  The analysis focuses on the
cases of Chile, Mexico and Bolivia (section 4).  Then the recent experience of
implementing programs of adjustment and reform in different economies of
Eastern Europe is assessed (section 5).  Then the analysis turns to two "Asian
Models" of reform:  Korea and China.  Those experiences differ from the Latin
American and East European ones in terms of intensity of the programs and the
relative priority attached to liberalization versus macroeconomic
consolidation (sections 6 and 7).  The discussion considers initial conditions
before reform, the main elements in the programs of adjustment and
liberalization, performance criteria regarding speed of macroeconomic
stabilization, output response and transition to growth and distributive
impact of the reforms.  Some observations on the political economy under which
the different programs are implemented will be provided.  Ths paper concludes
with  a  summing-up.
2.  The  emergence  of  a  new  naradicim  on  economic  reform:  origins
The 1990s is producing a remarkable sight.  Both capitalist as well as
formerly socialist economies alike are now embracing economic policies
conducive to reshape their economic landscapes along free market lines.
State-led development is clearly out of fashion, largely because of the Latin
American crises of the 1980s  and in spite (perhaps) of the East Asian record.
Furthermore, Stalinist socialism is definitely dead.3
Explaining the emergence and widespread acceptance of a new paradigm on
economic policy is a hard task that involves grasping a complex interaction
between events and ideas.
Major shocks to the world economy in the 1970s affected economic
performance and led to a reassessment of priorities and the content of
economic policies.  The first oil shock in 1973 gave rise to the simultaneous
worsening of macroeconomic conditions in industrialized countries as inflation
accelerated along with a simultaneous rise in unemployment, a slow-down in
ou:.put  growth and a trend of slower productivity growth, (particularly in the
US and Great Britain).  In the realm of ideas on economic policy, the
traditional post-World War II consensus combining demand management at
macroeconomic level with a welfare state came under challenge.  Reflecting
these trends, England under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher applied stiff
anti-inflationary measures along with policies aiming to reduce the role of
the state in the economy through the privatization of public enterprises, tax
cuts and economic deregulation.  A similar shift in emphasis and policy
priorities took place in the US after the election of President Reagan in
1980.  The new policies in the US centered around cutting taxes, reducing
business deregulation and financial liberalization, in the context of
increased fiscal deficits.  Both in the US and Britain, excessive government
involvement in economic activity and its outlets of taxes and regulation, (in
England also ths cutgrowth of public enterprises) were identified as main
causes behind sluggish capital formation, reduced entrepreneurial effort and
meager productivit:y  growth.
These changes in two main industrialized countries in the 1980s
certainly shaped, albeit gradually, a new climate in economic policy thinking
and formulation that eventually reached the developing world and the socialist
block'.
I  It is interesting that the reform policies in China, freeing
agriculture and giving a new impetus to private sector activity, stal'-' in
the late 1970s before the experiments in the US and the UK. Probably,
dominant influence in the Chinese process came from the remarkable dj.imism of
the neighboring NICs (Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore), see Sections 64
In the developing country  context, particularly in Latin Anerica, the
strategy of import substitution industrialization  (ISI)  pursued since the
thirties was already the subject of ample criticism because of its lack of
dynamism, anti-export bias and its failure to correct endemic concentration in
income distribution.  The role of the etite as a supporter of the ISI strategy
and the deteriorating record in terms of fiscal imbalances and inflation led
to a questioning of its role in the economy.  The experience with radical
market-oriented reform in Latin America can be traced to the early to mid-
seventies, in the southern Cone.  Following the collapse of populist-socialist
experiments, newly installed military regimes implemented sharp programs of
macroeconomic restraint and liberalization in Chile, Argentina and Uruguay. 2
Beyond the Southern Cone, the single, most important, shock that
catalyzed the drive towards economic reform in Latin America was the debt
crises of the eighties.  The debt shock triggered a protracted period of
stagnation, high inflation, fragile balance of payments positions and
increased economic instability in the region.  Increasingly, the economic
dislocation of the eighties led to the perception that overcoming the economic
crisis needed the restoration of macroeconomic equilibrium, a comprehensive
change in the structure of the economy, fiscal reform, privatization, open the
domestic economy to foreign competition.  In the eighties, comprehensive
programs along these lines were implemented in Mexico and Bolivia  (Chile, as
mentioned above, started its reforms in the mid-seventies);  followed by
Argentina in the early nineties.
In East Asia, the impressive performance of the NICs (Korea, Taiwan,
Singapore, Hong Kong) in terms of high growth, rapid technical progress,
enhanced international competitiveness, aggressive export penetration provided
a case for outward orientation and stable macro policies as an engine for
growth and development.  Certainly, the experience of the NIC's  backed the new
and 7.
2  See Ramos  (1986), Solimano  (1990),  Cardoso and Helwege (i992),
Dornbusch and Edwards (1991) for analysis of that period.5
drive for economic reform in the developing world, though these experiences,
as we shall see later, represent a more eclectic model of reform regarding the
role of the state and the relative importance given to liberalizaticn vis-a-
v_s macro consolidation in the process of economic transformation.
The coup de grace, perhaps, in favor of market based reform was the
collapse of the socialist experiment in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s,
followrl by the economic and political disintegration of the Soviet Union in
late 1991.  The sudden collapse of the socialist regimes gave rise to more
radical programs, particularly in their liberalization component, in Eastern
Europe compared to the Latin American counterparts of the seventies and
eighties.
3.  Program on design and performance
The standard package of market-based economic reform in an economy
starting from pervasive imbalances includes measures of both macroeconomic
stabilization and liberalization.  Macro restraint involves tight demand
policies (oriented to cut domestic absorption) coupled with real depreciation
of the exchange rate (to gain external competitiveness).
Liberalization policies include reform of the trade regime, deregulation
of controlled interest rates and other quantitative allocative mechanisms for
credit, elimination of regulation preventing domestic and foreign investment
in certain activities, privatization of public enterprises, changes in the tax
system.  Those policies are oriented to give markets a prominent role in the
resource allocation and growth process and reshape existing institutions in
order to make them more supportive to a market-based system.
The effects of changes in specific policy instruments on economic
activity, inflation and real wages and other indicators of economic
performance have been subject of debate for a long time.  The controversy
whether currency devaluations are contractionary or expansionary in the short
term is one example, the rigidity of inflation in the face of  cuts in money
growth in chronic inflation countries, the stagnationist effects of cuts6
in real wages are other. 3 Recently, new evidence is-  being produced on the
slow transition to medium-term growth in the aftermath of adjustment; in
particular the existence of a long investment lag and reduced capacity
utilization in the aftermath of adjustment. 4
Radical and Moderate Packages: Two Views
Two views can be distinguished here regarding the intensity and priority
given to macro adjustment and consolidation vis-a-vis liberalization in a
reform program.  One view emphasizes the fact that protracted austerity
involves a contraction in both current and probably future output, throuah the
adverse impact of sharp demand contraction on capital formation. 5 This view
calls for gradualism, or at least moderation in the amount of demand
contraction and currency depreciation, in an adjustment program, in order to
avoid large cuts in real wages and a protracted slump in economic activity and
growth.  In addition, this view highlights the potentially destabilizing
effects of rapid liberalization on macroeconomic stability.  For example a cut
in tariffs may involve a reduction in fiscal revenues hampering an already
flimsy fiscal budget; moreover, overly costly programs from a social point of
view may also give rise to future reversals because of the erosion of socio-
political support to reforms that are associated with a protracted squeeze of
living standards.  Furthermore, an important distinction is made between shock
treatment for stabilization purposes and gradualism in structural reforms that
involve the restructuring of enterprises, banks, tax systems and building of
new  institutions.
6
The other view, (the radicals) down plays the adverse effects of macro
restraint on capital formation and growth and emphasizes the positive effects
3  See Kiguel and Liviatan  (1992), Solimano (1990), Taylor (1991a and
1991b).
4See  Dornbusch  (1991); Solimano (1992).
5  See Serven and Solimano (1992a and 1992b).
6  See Bruno (1992).7
of l.beralization on the productivity of investment and the alleged efficiency
of growth in a liberalized policy regime.  Moreover, this view favors shock
therapy and rapid liberalization as a way to alter, in a dramatic fashion, the
expectations of the private sector and, thua boosting capital accumulation and
growth.  This view rests upon the notion that a change in policy regimes, as
distinguished from specific changes in policy instruments, is the fundamental
force driving private sector response to the new set of policies put in place
by a program of economic reform. 7
In the context of post-socialist transformation an important area of
controversy between "gradualists" and "big-bangers" is over the pace of
privatization.  The gradualist approach assumes that privatization is a
problem of social transformation, therefore an inherently slow, evolutionary
process. 8 The gradualist approach emphasizes privatization of small-medium
size enterprise to create a critical mass of "genuine Schumpeterian
entrepreneurs" with strong incentives for innovation and creation of new
business.  The privatization of large scale public enterprises would be a slow
process whose progress will depend upon the advance made in the creation of
other market institutions like a commercial banking system, regulatory
agencies, etc.
The radical approach to privatization of large ecale public enterprises
of post-socialist countries 9 emphasizes the need for the state to quickly get
rid of the large number of big state-owned enterprises.  Since these
enterprises are, often, loss making units, they put a burden on public
finances that will be ultimately destabilizing; in addition rapid
privatization will reduce the capacity of patronage by the state.
'  An influential paper along these lines, in the context of
stabilization, programs is Sargent (1982).
8  See Kornai  (1990a) and (1990b).
9  See Lipton and Sachs (1990b).8
Performance Criteria
To assess performance of economic reform, we will.  focus on three
criteria:  (a) stabilization, in particular the speed of disinflation;  (b) the
response of investment and growth to adjustment policies;  (c)  the distributive
impact of the reforms.  Of course, other criteria could be added to get a more
detailed evaluation of the programs.
Macroeconomic stabilization --  An important component of the programs of
economic reform is macroeconomic stabilization.  The accumulated experience on
stabilization shows that reducing intermediate-high inflation, on a more or
less permanent basis, is not an easy task, particularly in economies with a
long history of inflation.  Inertia, indexation and credibility problems are
pervasive in these economies, making the task of stabilization more
complicated.  For example, the stabilization of high inflation in countries
like Mexico, Chile, Israei shows that it may easily take nalf a decade or more
for high inflation to converge to annual rates of the order of 20-25 percent.
In socialist economies that start with repressed inflation, the process of
eliminating price controls is proving to be a complicated one too.  The
magnitude of the initial inflationary outburst after price reform is large and
the existence of persistence in inflation after the initial price shock is not
trivial  (see section 4).
Investment and Growth Response --  Macroeconomic restraint often leads to
drastic cuts in public and private investment rates, at least during the
initial phases of the adjustment process.  When the contraction in investment
rates becomes a protracted process, as it has been the case in most Latin
American economies during the 1980s, this endangers the rate of expansion of
productive capacities in the medium-term.  In addition, it has been detected
that the resumption of private investment after the initial contraction in
adjusting economies may take several years. 10 Moreover, the recovery of
public investment may take even longer, affecting, in a negative way, the
process of creation of complementary infrastructure needed to support private
10  See  Solimano  (1992).9
investment, export and output growth.  There are several reasons for the
pattern of initial investment contraction followed by a delay in the response
of private investment during an adjustment program:  initial demand
contraction and the creation of excess capacity, an increased value of waiting
in a conitext  of unconsolidated economic reform, the lack of supportive systems
(public physical infrastructure, credit, legal system, etc.).  Again, tnese
problems are bound to be particularly critical for reforming socialist
systems.
Distributive Impact --  Macroeconomic adjustment often brings about a cut in
real wages both in the private and public sectors in order to support real
currency depreciation and reduce current fiscal expenditures.  In addition the
slashing of government subsidies to credit and basic consumption goods also
produces changes in real incomes of  various groups (not necessarily a
regressive move).  Liberalization and privatization policies also have
(largely unexplored) effects on the distribution of wealth.
The evidence gathered in two recent studies on the subject" conducted
under auspices of WIDER and the OECD show that macro restraint and external
shocks that entail massive cut in real wages and/or increases in unemployment
hurt more the poor.  Moreover, major regressive redistributions of wealth have
taken place during financial crises following experiments of unregulated
financial liberalization.
1 2 On the other hand, the efforts at targeting
social spending in health and education during the course of adjustment has
helped to reduce the social impact of these policies on the very poor, in
spite of a trend of declining real social spending per capita detected in
Latin America. 
13
" The results of the WIDER project is reported in Taylor (1991) and the
conclusions of the OECD project are presented by Bourgignon, de Melo and
Morrison  (1991).
12  For example, massive subsidies to commercial banks and major debtors
placed an enormous burden on public finances and forced to cut social and
infrastructure spending in Chile after 1982.
13  See Lusting  (1992) for '<exico  and Meller (1992) for Chile.10
4.  Radical Economic Reform In Latin America: Chile, Mexico and Bolivia
Compreheasive market-oriented programs of economic reform in Latin
America started to be implemented since the mid-1970s in Chile, and in the
mid-1980s in Mexico and Bolivia; see table 1 and figures 1 and 2.  (Currently,
Argentina is following similar policies though it is still a new and non-
consolidated experience.)
Chile  The military regime that toppled Allende in 1973, initiated a
very ambitious program of free-market economic reform, at least given the
economic climate prevalent at the time in Latin America.  The program,
implemented under tight authoritarian conditions, involved comprehensive
macroeconomic stabilization and liberalization.  At the time the reforms
started to be applied, the Chilean economy exhibited large macroeconomic
imbalances in the form of high inflation rates and a large  fiscal deficit.' 4
Inflation was slow to decline in spite of tough austerity
--  the fiscal deficit was reduced from 25 percent of GDP in 1973 to near 3
percent in 1975.  Already in October 1973 most of the system of controlled
prices were lifted, and the exchange rate sharply devalued.  Subsidies on
credit and consumption goods were eliminated and all controls on interest
rates lifted.  In addition a gradual program --  over a four-year period --  of
tariff reduction was enacted in order to bring down tariffs rates from three
digit levels to an uniform import duty of 10 percent (by  mid 1979).  Public
sector reform included large cuts in public sector employment, privatization
of public enterprises, many of them nationalized under Allende, and the
imposition of a value added tax to improve tax collection.  In the second half
of the seventies the Chilean economy experienced rapid growth in a context of
declining inflation and consolidating fiscal adjustment.  Nevertheless, during
most of that period unemployment remained very high.  Financial deregulation
and currency overvaluation leu to an overexpansion of financial
intermediation, and the accumulation of a large stock of internal and external
14 See Corbo (1985), Meller (1991), and Corbo and Solimano  (1991) for a
discussion of the reforms adopted in the Chilean economy in the last two
decades.11
debt.  In 1982-83 the Chilean economy suffereu a deep recession and a severe
financial crisis as a consequence of adverse external shocks and previous
policy mistakes.  The post 1984 recovery was strong, with GDP growing at more
than 6 percent per year (1984-89) in a context of relative macroeconomic
stability, lower real interest rates and favorable copper prices  (since 1987).
In addition, a depreciated real exchange rate --  coupled with depressed real
wages and a considerable pool of unemployed labor --  favored the rapid
expansion of non-traditional exports, therefore helping to consolidate the
improvement in external accounts,  (see  table 1 and charts 1-2).
The political economy of reform in Chile is an important element to be
considered.  The intensity of the reforms as well as its large social costs
were possible, to a considerable extent, because they were applied under the
particular conditions of a military regime that governed for many years
without open political opposition as political parties were banned, main labor
organizations declared illegal and with no parliament in operation.  The
situation started to be relaxed, towards the late 1980s following a
preannounced transition to democracy that included a plebiscite in 1988 and a
national election of president and parliament in late 1989.  The democratic
administration that took office in early 1990 maintained mcst of the economic
policies implemented under the military regime.  The bulk of the market-
oriented system was preserved, though introducing changes in the labor
legislation to rebalance the bargaining power of labor vis a vis capital,
taxes were increased modestly and a program of social spending to alleviate
poverty and improve incoiue  distribution patterns was initiated.
Mexico  The Mexican economy for decades followed a strategy of import
substitution, growing state involvement in the economy and corporatist
politics.  Mexico in the second half of the seventies, following the discovery
of oil, engaged in a cycle of fiscal expansion, currency appreciation and
'Large  foreign debt accumulation that came to a sudden halt in 1982. In that
year the country embarked in a drastic program of macroeconomic adjustment
comprising demand restraint, real depreciation of the exchange rate and large12
Table 1
Economic  Indicators
Reforming  Economies in Latin America: Chile, Mexico, Bolivia
(annual averages, percent)
Growth Rate of  Inflation  Investment  Terms of Trade
GDP  Exports  Real Waaes  Rate  (CPI)  (ratio of GDP)  (1980=l00)
Chile  Pre-reform  1960-70  4.3  3.6  6.0  25.7  20.6  165.1 Period  1971-73  0.7  -3.8  -8.7  296.0  14.7  175.3
Reform  1974-81  3.9  14.4  10.0  163.9  17.2  121.5 Period  1982-85  -1.5  4.8  -4.4  19.0  10.5  82.4
1986-91  6.0  11.9 a  2.9  19.2  16.7 a  86.8
1974-91  3.4  11.4  3.7  84.1  15.6  101.3
Mexico  Pre-reform  1970-81  6.8  7.7  0.9  16.8  22.1  105.9
Period
Reform  1982-85  0.4  9.2  -7.0  71.0  16.8  99.4 Period  1986-91  1.7  5.1 a  1.6  67.0  16.8 a  69.5
1982-91  1.2  6.9 a  -2.6  69.7  16.8 a  81.5
Bolivia  Pre-reform  1970-81  3.5  -0.9  1.0  19.6  14.4  76.2 Period  1982-85  -2.5  2.2  -3.3  3358.3  7.2  87.9
Reform  1986-87  0.0  1.3  -7.3  145.5  5.1  56.0 Period  1988-91  2.9  16.8 a  9.5 c  15.7  6.1 a  55.0
1986-91  1.9  10.6  a  --  59.3  6.4  a  55.3
Note: (a)  Exports and Real Investment figures are available only up to 1990.
(b)  Stabilization cum structural adjustment program was launched in August 1985.
(c)  Figures refer to 1988-1990 period and are not directly comparable to previous years.
Source:  World Bank, ECLAC  (1990,1991).13
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cuts in real wages.  Those policies were further deepened since 1985 with
trade reform, deregulation and market liberalization.  Quotas were reduced
from covering 100 percent of (non-oil) tradeable goods production to lose than
17 percent at present, with a similar trend in tariffs.1 5 In addition, the
tax system was reformed, regulations on domestic and foreign investments were
phased out, and the financial system was reformed.  Moreover, a severe program
of disinflation was launched in late 1987 that combined additional  fiscal
adjustment with incomes policies to abate a stubbornly high rate of
inflation.1 6
After a long period of sluggish growth and slow disinflation,  the
Mexican economy started to show signs of recovery in 1988.  Disinflation and
the gradual recovery were boosted by a debt reduction deal in the context of
the Brady initiative in 1989, the hastening of the privatization and
deregulatory process and the initiative for a free trade agreement with the
United States.  During 1990-91, GDP grew at an average rate of 4 percent per
year.
The political economy of the reforms in Mexico is interesting.  They
have been impulsed from within the ruling political  system by a generation of
young, highly qualified, economists within the PRI (Partido Revolucionario
Institutional) a party that not so long ago backed for many decades a
radically different development model based on state dirigism and import
substitution.
Bolivia  This is a case of free market reform in a small, poor economy  (its
level of income per-capita is below 600 hundred dollars),' 7 strongly dependent
on the export of a few mineral commodities --  natural gas and tin --  and with
a small base of human capital and physical infrastructure.
15  See Van Wijnbergen  (1991).
16 An analysis of the stabilization program of late 1987 appears in Ortiz
(1991).
17 World Development Report, 1991.15
Bolivia suffered mounting economic instability and negative GDP growth
in the first half of the 1980s.  This process culminated in the hyperinflation
of the first eight months of 1985.  In August of 1985 a drastic and successful
anti-inflationary program was launched; as a result of it inflation declined
from more than 25,000 per cent in 1985 to an average annual rate of 16.5 in
the period 1987-1990.  In addition, the anti-inflationary program was followed
by a series of policies of structural adjustment including trade
liberalization  (tariffs rates were rapidly reduced after 1985 to a range
between 5 to 10 percent).  In addition, most of the system of price controls,
state subsidies and guaranteed prices were eliminated.  Public sector prices
were adjusted to reflect opportunity costs, interest rates ceilings were
removed and domestic and foreign commercial banks were allowed to receive
deposits denominated in dollars.
The Bolivian program of economic reform started in 1985 provides an
example of rapid elimination of a hyperinflation.  In less than two years, as
mentioned before, inflation was brought down  (and  maintained) at a level
around 16 percent per year starting from four digit range.  On the real side,
the program of disinflation and liberalization was followed by a protracted
period of depressed private investment and slow, albeit positive, GDP growth.
In spite of the success on the stabilization front the Bolivian program
still shows signs of incomplete adjustment.  The fiscal deficit averaged 5.4
percent of GDP in  the period 1996-90, pushing real interest rates up and
crowding-out private investment.'g In addition, the financial system is
highly dollarized as near 80 percent of the liabilities of the banking system
are denominated in foreign currency, reflecting lack of confidence in domestic
assets.
The Bolivian economic reform program was launched by a civilian
government led by President Paz Estenssoro elected in 1985, after two decades
of alternation of civilian and military government implementing a wide range
18  Incidentally real interest rates in Bolivian pesos and also in dollars
have remained well above international rates.  See Calvo and Guidotti  (1991).16
of economic policies ranging from populism to orthodox austerity programs.
The post-1985 reforms were implemented in democracy, though in a country with
a large indigenous and peasant population with little incidence in formal
politics.
A Look at Performance in the Three  Countries
A full evaluation of the reform policies in the three countries,
considering counterfactuals of alternative policies is beyond the scope of
this paper.  Nevertheless let us look at our performance criteria in the three
countries.
Stabilization Performance.  The experience with stabilization in Chile and
Mexico and to a less extent Bolivia shows that reducing and stabilizing
inflation is a costly and often lengthy process.  In Mexico and Chile, it took
between 6 to 7 years from the beginning of the program of stabilization, to
reduce three-digits iniflation  to levels around 20-25 percent per annum (see
table 2).  In Chile the rate of inflation was over 600 percent in 3974
converging to levels below 20-25 percent per year just after 1981 in spite of
stiff stabilization measures.  In Mexico the rate of inflation was near 100
percent in 1982 reaching the critical range of 20-25 percent per year just in
1989.  In contrast, the speed of stabilization in Bolivia was faster than in
Chile and Mexico.  The Bolivian case fits well with the international evidence
showing that the stabilization of a hyperinflation is often more rapid than
the stabilization of chronic inflation.' 9
Impact on Investment and Growth of Reform.  The stabilization and adjustment
programs in the three countries came along with an initial output contraction
though the degree of the output decline varied in each case: GDP fell by
around 12-15 percentage points in the recessions of 1975 and 1982-83 in Chile;
output contracted (cumulatively) by nearly 5 percent in Mexico in 1982-83 and in
19 See Sargent (1982), Dornbusch and Fischer (1988), Solimano  (1990a).17
Table 2.  Indicators of Speed of Adjustment - Latin America
Number of Years for
Private Investment to
Number of Years for Inflation  Recover to Sustained Levels
to reach the threshold of  (more than 3 years of
20-25 percent per year"  consecutive Expansion)
Chile"
1974-89  7 years  5 years
Mexico
1982-91  7 years  6 years
Bolivia
1985-91  2 years
0Counting  from the stabilization plan of 1975.18
Bolivia it fell by 2.5 percent in 1986.  In all these episodes, these
economies suffered also negative external shocks.
Regarding investment, the experience of Chile in the 1970s and Mexico in
the 1980s is that public investment tends to suffer in the initial phases of
an adjustment program.  In Chile, between 1976 and 1984 public investment was
maintained around 3 to 4 percentage points of GDP below its level of the
sixties.  In Mexico, public investment declined by nearly 5 percentage points
of GDP in the period 1982-89 as compared to 1978-81.  In contrast, public
investment started to recover in Bolivia after the program of 1985.
The response of private investment to the reform process in the three
countries was mixed.2  In Chile, private investment increased strongly in the
second half of the seventies, to drop sharply during the recession of 1982-83
and recover a few years later.  In Mexico, private investment declined from
1981 to 1983, then it remained virtually stagnant until 1987, recovering
afterwards.  In Bolivia, private investment was declining before the program
in the first half of the eighties.  That decline stopped with the launching of
the adjustment program in 1985; however, it remained quite depressed
afterwards (see table 2).
Distributive Impact.  An important and contentious issue is the impact of the
adjustment programs on poverty and income distribution.  Table 1 shows that in
Chile (1971-73) and Bolivia (1982-85) real wages were falling before the
adoption of the stabilization programs.  In general, the rapid escalation of
inflation before reform in these two countries was the main cause of the
decline in real wages.  Thus, stopping high inflation becomes a condition sine
qua non for reversing a negative trend in real wages.  However, real wages
remained depressed for a long while in Chile; in fact, the average real wage
was still lower in 1989 than in 1970.  In addition, during most of the
Pinochet regime the average rate of unemployment was more than two times
0 A detailed analysis of the cycle of private investment in adjustment
programs appears in Solimano (1992).19
higher, on average, than the rate of unemployment of previous decades.  This
suggests that low-income groups bore a large share of the costs of adjustment
in Chile.
Several indicator. portrayed in tables 3 and 4 convey useful  information
on the distributive consequence. of the policies applied in Chile after 1974.
The Gini coefficient increased (greater inequality) by around 4 points  (a non-
negligible amount) between the late sixties and the early 1980s.  In addition,
thle  share in consumption  for the lowest 40 percent income group declined
steadily both in 1978 and 1988 compared with 1969 (Meller, 1991).  These
effects were meliorated in part with an improvement in some social indicators.
There  was  a  decline  in  the  rate  of  infant mortality  (now one of the lowest in
Latin America) and in different  indicators of malnutrition as a consequence of
an Lncreasing targeting of some soclal programs to more vulnerable groups in
extreme  poverty.
in  Mexico,  the  adjustment  policies  started  to  be  implemented  after  1982
had  a  negative  Impact  on  total  labor  incomes  and  particularly  on  real  wages
(Lustig,  1992).  Real  wages  in  manufacturing declined by a cumulative 38.5
percent in the period 1983-88, with an even larger decline of real wages in
the public sector (table 5).  Nevertheless, real per capita consumption
declined by 11.5 percent over the same period suggesting that non-wage incomes
(of  the poor and the rich) must have declined by less than wage incomes. 2"
Regarding the evolution of social expenditure in Mexico shows a decline of
around 1.0 percent of GDP in social spending in education per capita between
1981 and 1989 and a reduction of 1.6 percent of GDP in expenditure  in health
over  the  same  period  (Lustig,  1992).
To  sum  up,  the  review  of  three  Latin American experience with market-
based economic reform in the 1970s and 1980s  shows  that  reforming distressed
economies is a long process.  Putting the "house in order" in macroeconomic
terms is not easy.  In the cases reviewed, stabilizing inflation took longer
2k  Non-wage income recipients include low income groups in the rural and
the urban informal sectors (self-employed workers, small enterprises, the
workers employed in the service sector).20
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than anticipated and involved considerable costs in terms of real economic
activity and real wages.  Moreover, the transition to sustainable growth in
the aftermath of stabilization is cumbersome.  Public and private investment
tend to suffer in the initial phases of an adjustment program.  Moreover, a
sustained recovery of private investment after a large initial contraction may
take several years.
Regarding the distributive impact of adjustment programs, the available
evidence shows that adjustment policies  (compounded by negative external
shocks) involved cuts in real wages and/or increases in unemployment rates in
Chile, Bolivia and Mexico, making low-income groups to bear a large share of
the adjustment burden.  On the positive side, the expansion of non-traditional
exports and the discipline of enhanced foreign competition on the domestic
economy are valuable effects of the reforms.
5.  Radical Economic Reform in Eastern Europe after 1989
The current attempts in Eastern Europe to transform socialist economies
based in state ownership and central planning into market economies is perhaps
one of the most ambitious attempts at economic reform in modern times.  Far
worse, there were practically no previous experience with economic
transformation of this magnitude.A
Free-market experiments of economic reform started in 1990, following
the political collapse of the socialist regimes.  This process is very complex
given that the initial conditions of these economies are particularly poor in
terms initial macro imbalances, pervasive micro-distortions and oversized
public sectors.  In addition, the reforms are taking place in emergent
democracies with a considerable degree of political fragmentation.
=  Attempts at partial economic reform are much older in Eastern Europe.
Hungary started with set-backs a program of economic decentralization and
gradual "marketization" in 1968.  Poland and Yugoslavia also tried reforms in
the early 1980s though those programs were seen as reforms within the existing
economic system rather than as reforms to replace the socialist regime for a
market economy.22
Country Programs
Poland launched in January 1990 the first comprehensivw program to establish a
market system in Eastern Europe.  The Polish program combined fiscal
austerity with price deregulation, trade liberalization and privatization.
The Polish economy started its program of economic reform with large
macroeconomic imbalances, shortages in consumer goods markets and a large
stock of external debt.  Inflation was 640 percent in 1989, following large
devaluations coupled with wage increases in 1988-89.  GDP growth slowed-down
in the 1980-88 (see table 6) and turned negative, -1.4 percent, in 1989.  The
current account deficit in convertible currency was 2.5 percent of GDP in 1989
and debt servicing, represented near 56 percent of merchandise exports in
1990.
The program of January, 1990 entitled the dismantling of most price
controls and sharp increases in energy prices and public tariffs.  The
exchange rate was fixed at a substantially depreciated level and the zloty was
made convertible for current account transactions.  Tariffs and other
quantitative restrictions to international trade were rapidly eliminated.
On the fiscal side a reduction of the fiscal deficit on the order of
7 percent of GDP was planned though much less was actually attained.  Monetary
and credit policy was tightened and a tax on wages was instituted in order to
prevent wage increases granted by enterprises to exceed government guidelines.
Privatization was initiated by selling restaurants, shops in the trade
sector and small-size enterprises.  However, little progress has been made in
the privatization of large state owned public enterprises, in spite of the
proliferation of sophisticated schemes deviced for that purpose.
D  A growing literature on the Polish case exists nowadays. See Lipton and
Sachs (1990a), Sachs and Berg (1991), Calvo and Coriceiii  (1991).23
Table 6
East-Central  Europe: Economic Indicators
Growth Rates (percent) a/  Inflation  Current Acct./GDP  Ext.  Debt/GDP
(percent  (Conv. Curr.)  (Conv. Curr.) GDP $Bil  NMP  GDP  year end)  (percent)  (percent) Countries  1990  1970-80  1980-88  1989  1990  1991  1989  1990  1991a/  1989  1990  1991b/  1990
Bulgaria  22.4  7.0  4.4  -1.4  -10.2  -26.0  6.3  64.0  430.0  -6.4  -2.7  0.0  40.2
Czechoslovakia  46.5  4.7  2.0  1.3  -3.5  -16.4  1.3  13.9  49.0  0.9  -1.0  -5.1  16.5
Hungary  32.1  4.5  1.3  -0.9  -6.5  -7.8  18.0  30.0  32.0  -4.9  -0.2  1.0  62.2
Poland  62.3  5.4  1.0  -0.5  -14.0  -9.0  640.0  249.0  60.4  -2.7  -2.5  -1.2  74 3
Romania  35.5  9.3  4.7  -5.8  -10.2  -10.0  2.5  27.0  184.0  5.4  -3.9  4.8  5.6
a/  January-November.
b/  Cash basis.  The current account on an accrual basis was -7.5 percent  in Bulgaria (due to arrears on foreign debt servicing).
Source:  World Bank24
Czechoslovakia started its program of economic reform in 1990 with apparently
small macro imbalances, no money overhang  (Bruno 1992) and a low level of
external debt  (the  ratio of foreign debt over GDP was 19 percent in 1990). 
In the 1980s, Czechoslovakia decelerated growth sharply, thongh maintaining
low open inflation.  The program in Czechoslovakia inv lved a stepwise
deregulation of controlled prices in 1990, followed by a complete elimination
of most price subsidies and controls in early 1991.  In addition, fiscal
policy was restrictive as well as credit and wage policy.  After a substantial
initial devaluations of the crown Czechoslovakia pegged the exchange rate as a
nominal anchor.  Like in Poland, privatization took place at a fast pace at
the level of retail trade and services.  A massive plan for auctioning shares,
through a voucher system, of 1,200 state-owned enterprises to more than 8.5
millions of citizens is to be launched by early June of this year.
Hungary started its reforms already in 1968 though they were partial and with
setbacks.  By 1982 nearly half of the prices for consumer goods were free, a
proportion that went up to 80 percent in 1990.  In addition, private property
in housing and small scale enterprises was in effect in the 1980s, accompanied
by new tax and banking laws.  Hungary was caught in the late 1980 with almost
no monetary overhang; however, its level of external debt was high (65  percent
of GDP in 1990).  In early 1991 the exchange rate was devalued by 15 percent
and additional consumer goods prices were freed in the context of fiscal,
monetary and wage restraint.  The exchange rate regime followed a fixed peg.
Bulgaria, an agrarian economy before socialism, industrialized and become
strongly dependent in its foreign trade with the Soviet Union under a highly
orthodox socialist regime.  Bulgaria-started its reform program in 1990 with a
>  Historically, Czechoslovakia was characterized by a prudent macro
management.  Czechoslovakia avoided hyperinflation  (unlike  Austria, Germany
and Poland) in the early 1920s and also suffered mildly from the depression of
the early 1930s as it had accumulated little external debt in previous years;
see Solimano (1991).25
large monetary overhang, repressed inflation and a high level of external
debt, mostly accumulated during the second half of the eighties.5
Price reform started piecemeal in 1990, though it accelerated in
February of 1991 when most price controls were abolished, subsidies phased out
and the exchange rate left floating (due  to the lack of international reserves
to support a fixed parity).  The ensuing exchange rate depreciation was huge,
500 percent, and it produced a price hike of vast proportions  (see next
section).  Current account convertibility was introduced and trade taxes
sharply reduced.  In addition, wage and credit policy turned very tight.
Plans for privatization are underway and some progress has already taken place
in retail trade and services.
Romania entered the process of economic reform after the violent  overthrown
of  Nicolae Ceausescu in late 1989.  In spite of  some independent stance in
foreign policy regarding the USSR, the economic policies followed by the
Ceausescu regime were extremely orthodox (in a socialist sense).  The trend
toward some decentralization and reform of the other socialist countries in
the 1980s and before, never reached Romania.>  On the contrary, the tendency
was towards further centralization and deepened central planning.  In the
eighties, the Ceausescu regime followed a deliberate policy of paying --  even
prepaying --  its external debts at almost any cost.  For that purpose the
country was running increasing trade surpluses by compressing consumption,
investment and imports.  Moreover fiscal surpluses were increased through the
curtailment of social spending, further squeezing living standards.  At the
end of the regime the external debt of Romania was almost nil though the
economy was in shambles.
D  See Solimano (1991b).
>  See Demekas and Khan (1991).26
Price liberalization took place in three rounds: November 1990, and
April  and July of 1991.27 Currently, near 80 percent of prices are determined
in the market.  The exchange rate was devalued in each of these rounds,
jumping from 20 leu per dollar before november 1990 to 60 leu after the last
adjustment, thus accumulating a nominal devaluation of 300 percent in near 8
months.  The exchange rate was left floating and to be determined in an
interbank market, with the exception of some basic imports.  The trade regime
has been reformed through abolishing the state monopoly on international trade
and by eliminating quantitative restrictions and reducing the average level of
tariffs to the range of 10 to 30 percent.  On the fiscal side the forced
profit remittance system was replaced by a corporate income tax.  A new
privatization law was enacted in 1991, though with little progress so far in
encouraging actual privatization.
Initial Results and Performance
Two years or less of economic reform in Eastern Europe is obviously a
very short period to make a thorough assessment of policy performance.
However some common features from the experience in Eastern Europe are
starting to emerge.  Price reform produced an immediate and often sharp
increase in the price level.  In most of these countries, the price hike in
general exceeded what was expected.Y
Poland and Bulgaria experienced the sharpest increases in prices
following the lifting of price controls and elimination of subsidies.  The CPI
in January of 1990 increased by 77 percent in Poland.  In Bulgaria inflation
was 110.1 percent in February, and 46.7 percent in March.  Hungary avoided a
major price jump and in Czechoslovakia the CPI increased by near 26 percent in
January 1991 following price adjustments.  In Romania, prices increased by
near 25 percent in the first month after price liberalization  (table 7).
"  See Demekas and Khan (1991).
2  See Bruno (1992).27
Table  7
East-Central  Europe:  CPI  Monthly
Inflation  Rates  (Dercent)
Bulgaria  Czechoslovakia  Hungary  Poland  Romania
1990
January  0.8  15.4  77.3  -
February  0.8  2.4  2.9  15.8  -
March  0.7  1.2  4.7  -
April  0.8  1.9  6.6  -
May  0.8  0.8  0.2  4.5  -
June  3.5  -0.1  3.8  -
July  3.4  2.2  4.9  -
August  16.6  10.0  3.2  1.8  -
September  4.5  1.3  4.6  -
October  4.2  1.0  5.7  -
November  5.4  4.3  1.0  4.9  23.4
December  10.2  -0.1  5.9  11.6
1991
January  14.4  25.8  7.5  12.7  14.8
February  110.1  7.0  4.9  6.7  7.0
March  46.7  4.7  3.7  4.5  6.6
April  3.6  2.0  2.4  2.7  26.5
May  2.5  1.9  2.1  2.7  5.1
June  7.4  1.8  2.1  4.9  2.0
July  9.8  -0.1  0.9  0.1  9.5
August  5.0  0.0  0.2  0.6  11.2
September  4.2  0.3  1.5  4.3  7.3
October  3.8  -0.1  1.3  3.2  10.4
November  5.1  1.6  1.4  3.2  10.9
Sources:  IM4F  staff  estimates.28
Another important issue is the degree of inflationary persistence after
the initial outburst of inflation.  Table 7 shows that persistence is
relatively important in Poland, Bulgaria and Romania and less so in
Czechoslovakia and Hungary.
Apparently, there is considerable cross-country variation in the extent
of inflation acceleration following price decontrol, and adjustment in the
exchange rate and public tariffs; see figures 3a-b.  These differences seem to
reflect different initial macro imbalances and the size of the money overhang
existing before price reform.  Regarding monetary accommodation and wage
indexation, a common feature of the East European stabilization programs
implemented since 1990 has been a stance of restrictive monetary and credit
policies supplemented with wage repression (or de-indexation).  An important
medium-term issue refers to the rate of inflation that this post-socialist
economies will converge after the stabilization period (assuming it succeeds);
in particular, whether the inflation rates in Eastern Europe will converge to
OECD-levels  (single-digit rates) or to approach inflation-rates of successful
non-OECD stabilizers like Mexico, Chile, Israel, namely to annual rates around
20 percent.
on the real side, the adjustment programs in Eastern Europe have been
accompanied by unprecedent output contraction; see figures 4a-e.  In Poland
GDP fell by 12.5 percent in 1990, and by an additional 9.0 percent in 1991
completing a cumulative decline of the order of 20 percent in two years.  The
magnitude of the output losses has been even larger in Bulgaria where  GDP
fell by 10.2 percent in 1990 and by an extra 26 percent in 1991; namely a
cumulative drop of output of over 35 percent in two yearsl.  In Czechoslovakia
GDP fell by -3.5 percent in 1990 and by -16.4 percent in 1991.  In Hungary the
drop of GDP was -6.5 percent in 1990 and -7.8 percent in 1991.
In an international perspective, the extent of the contraction in
measured economic activity in Eastern Europe since 1990 is much greater than
the corresponding declines in output initially observed in Chile, Mexico,
Bolivia after the implementation of their stabilization programs.29
The extent of output contraction in Eastern Europe has to be qualified,
somewhat, since it mostly reflects the decline in economic activity in the
socialized sector.  Casual and anecdotal evidence suggests that a burgeoning
private sector is emerging in the services and retail sectors.  However, since
the state sector is still (and it is bound to be for many years) the dominant
one, the decline in GDP is a worrisome trend.  Moreover, there is a slow but
persistent increase in unemployment in Eastern Europe which already exceeds 11
percent in Poland and Bulgaria.
Several hypothesis are being put forward to explain the current drop in
output in the region:  (i)  Demand contraction as part of the stabilization
effort.  The combination of tight credit and fiscal policies as well as large
drops in real wages lead to a decline of  effective demand and a drop in output
in Keynesian fashion;9 (ii)  Adverse supply and organizational shocks.  The
dismantling of central planning has involved a disruption of the traditional
supply networks of inputs and capital to enterprises, thus contributing to the
decline in production.  A context of high uncertainty on the future rules of
the game regarding the property structure has also a discouraging effect on
worker effort and managerial motivation.  At a macro level, another adverse
supply side effect comes from a crunch in the supply of working capital (Calvo
and Coricelli, 1991); (iii) External shocks associated to the disintegration
of the CMEA.  The elimination of the subsidies in soviet exports to CMEA
countries typically oil, coal and other forms of energy amounted to a terms of
trade shock for Eastern Europe with the ensuing adverse real income effectx.
(iv) Too rapid trade liberalization.  A rapid switching in domestic demand
towards foreign goods has recessionary results in the short-term since a
sizeable shift to exports to western markets is unlikely to take place in a
9  Berg and Sachs (1992) argue that demand contraction, in the context of
the stabilization program, has been the main cause behind the drop in GDP in
Poland in 1990-91.
0  The response to the terms of trade shock has been a mix of adjustment
and financing; the latter is from multilateral and bilateral official sources
besides some private capital inflows.30
short period of time, in spite of highly competitive exchange rates (quality
problems, particularly, in manufacturing are serious). 3
Regarding the social costs of reform in Eastern Europe, the current
experience shows that adjustment is involving large cuts in real wages and a
slow but steady upward trend in unemployment.  The medium-term outlook may be
gloomy as a rapid turn around in the decline in aggregate output in the state
sector is not in sight, and the restructuring process in the state owned
enterprises has barely started.  The current rise in economic insecurity and
"adjustment distress" is making the politics of the transition very
complicated; bringing the shadow of a slide back to authoritarianism and/or
populism quite real.
31  See Mc Kinnon (1991) for an argument in favor of gradualism in trade
reform in post-socialist transitions.31
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6.  Gradual Economic Reform I: Korea
The East Asian experience, of the last three decades particularly  the
case of Korea, is an extremely interesting case of highly dynamic development
based in export growth and high levels of capital formation.  Korean policies
were pursued in a context of active, but competent,  state intervention and
stable macro environment.=  Korea embarked after 1962 in an aggressive
strategy of investment cum export led-growth.  The new program of economic
transformation reform combined orthodox policies of exchanse rate management
to increase exports while liberalizing Imports.  Policies relied, in a
planning faahion, in a series of five-year plans oriented to boost
industrialization with active support from credit and exchange rate policies.
Foreign aid was substituted by increased domestic savings and foreign
borrowing.  The results were remarkable as GDP grew at an annual rate of 10
percent per year between 1965-1973 while exports were expanding at an annual
rate of 40-50 percent between 1960-73 (Collins and Park, 1989).  In 1973, the
Korean government launched a "Big Push" oriented to increase investment in
heavy and chemical industries, while introducing additional import
restrictions and new credit controls.  These policies allowed rapid growth,
though the excessive investment drive and government  subsidies led to
increasing inflationary pressures and a loss of external competitiveness.
The problems with heavy industrialization and accelerated inflation,
compounded by the second oil shock forced the adoption of adjustment measures
in 1980-81.  Monetary policy become tighter, the fiscal budget deficit was
reduced from 4.7 percent of GDP in 1981 to 1 percent in 1985, imports were
liberalized in a selective way, and regulations over the financial system and
foreign direct investment lifted gradually.  A new period of rapid growth, low
inflation and current account surplus took place since the mid-eighties.
n Excellent analysis of the Korean experiences are Collins and Park




1963/?3  1274/80  1981/86  1287Z9.Q
Inflation  17.1  22.9  6.6  5.9
Real  GDP growth  9.5  7.3  9.2  10.3
Manufact. Production  19.7  1401  10.0  10.8
Share in GNP
Agriculture  35.2  21.5  14.0  10.7
Manufacturing  15.7  28.1  31.4  32.1
Other  49.1  50.4  54.6  57.2
Exports as share of GNP  13.2  30.6  37.3  37.3
Investment as share of GNP  20.0  29.2  29.5  31.9
Foreign Saving share of GNP  8.3  7.4  3.9  -3.4
Domestic Share share of GNP  11.7  21.8  25.6  35.3
sogrces  IFS,  IMF  --  World  Tables.  World  Bank.35
Regarding macroeconomic stability, Korea managed to keep inflation in
the range of 15-20 percent per year during the sixties ard seventies.  After
the stabilization of 1980-81 inflation was reduced below 10 percent.  In
general, Korea avoided the kind of macroeconomic crises so common in Latin
America, even though during 1980-81 inflation accelerated and GDP growth
slowed down sharply.  Korea ran large current account deficits --  of the order
of 8-9 percent of GDP --  in the late sixties, in 1974 and in 1980-81, though
it managed to correct them without compromising GDP growth, in a major way.
In addition, fiscal imbalances never reached large proportions and the budget
was kept, in general, under control.  Besides the episode of currency
overvaluation of the late seventies, the exchange rate policy, along with
active credit policies, were directed to enhance external competitiveness and
boost export growth.  In short, the process of economic development in Korea,
has unfolded without large shocks and destabilizing macroeconomic crisis.
In relation to the investment and growth performance, what is striking
of the Korean experience is its ability to sustain very high growth rates, on
the order of 8 percent per year, for nearly three decades.  Behind that strong
growth performance we find an impressive investment drive with rates of
capital formation on the order of 30 percent of GDP in the 1970s and 1980s.
In addition, the Korean economy was able to mobilize domestic savings
effectively to support the effort at capital formation by raising the domestic
saving rate from near 6 percent of GDP in 1963 to 30 percent in 1985 (Collins
and Park, 1989).  This growth performance, did not take place in a laissez-
faire regime.  Governments encouraged export growth and investment using, for
a long time, trade restrictions, direc-ted  credit intervention and increased
taxation in a context of close cooperation with business conglomerates; though
government intervention avoided the anti-export bias of most Latin American
cases.  Finally, another factor behind the strong growth performance of Korea
is her ability of maintaining high rates of productivity growth.  Like other
"late industrializers" Korea pursued a deliberate policy of borrowing advanced
foreign technologies to enhance competitiveness and growth  (see  Amsden, 1990).36
An interesting feature of the Korean modpl is that income distribution was
maintained re'atively equitable during the transformation process unless
compared to the standards of other developing countries, particularly in Latin
America.  In fact, the share in national income of the bottom 40 percent of
the population in Korea is higher than the corresponding ratio in countries
like Brazil, Mexico, Thailand and Hong Kong.  Moreover, the income share of
the top 20 percent is lower in Korea than the corresponding share in Brazil,
Mexico, Thailand and Hong Kong.
The agrarian reform undertaken in the late forties has buen identified
as one of the most important factors in the relatively egalitarian income
distribution of Korea (Collins and Park, 1989).  Another major factor in this
direction has been a sustained effort of improvement in the educational levels
of the population and labor force since the sixties.33
Regarding the political economy of the Korean model, the program of
economic transformation started in the early sixties was launched by a
military regime, led by General Park Chung Hee, that took power in a coup in
1961 and remained president until 1979.  In the 1980s the military still run
the country though the system started to implement measures of political
liberalization towards the mid to late eighties.
7.  Gradual Economic Reform II:  China
China's experience with economic reform following the death of  Mao Dze
Dong and the abandonment of the policies of the cultural revolution of  the
period 1966-76 represent a quite different pattern of economic reform of that
followed in Eastern Europe in the last two years.  First, in China, the
process of economic reform was impulsed "from within" the socialist regime.
It was the leadership of the communist party that got convinced that moving
away from central planning was needed in order to accelerate economic growth
33  Secondary enrollment,as percent of age group, increased from 35 percent
in 1965 to 89 percent in 1988.In addition, the percentage of higher education,
with respect to the age group went up from 6 percent in 1965 to 37 percent in
1988. See World Development Report, 1991 (World  Bank, 1989).37
and improve the standards of living of the population.  Unlike Eastern Europe,
economic reform in China was not the natural corollary of a political crises
of the whole socialist system.  Second, the -conomic reform process in China
was not openly envisaged as the replacement of the socialist economic model by
a market economy based in private property.  Socialism was never officially
dismissed in China and public property has not been officially challenged.
Third, economic reform was perceived as a gradual process of increasing
coexistence between markets and the state with a great concern on maintaining
price stability and macroeconomic balances over the rapid achievement of
liberalization policies.  Fourth, the structural characteristics of the
Chinese economy at the starting of the reform process makes it very different
from the economies of Eastern Europe.  China is a large economy with a
population above 1 billion, with a large agricultural sector and belongs to
the group of countries with a low level of per-capita income, say below 500
dollar.34 In addition, unlike Poland or Bulgaria and Romania, China started
its program of reform in the late 1970s with low open inflation and no clear
monetary overheng.
The program of economic reform started in 1978 with a deregulation of
the agricultural sector (the "household responsibility system").3  This
implied an increase in agricultural procurement prices paid by the state,
allowing farmers to sell their production surpluses in free markets after
delivering a pre-determined quota to the state.  In addition, they were
allowed to retain profits.  This led to flourishing agricultural activity and
the growth of small scale enterprises in rural markets and townships.
Starting in 1984, an "enterprise responsibility system" was established for
state enterprises in the industrial sector.  The system comprised a dual or
two-tier price scheme.  Like in agriculture, state owned enterprises were
34  The World Development Report of the WoL1  d Bank puts the GDP per capita
of China in US$ 350 in 1989.
35  Good references on the Chinese experience with economic reform are:
Perkins (1988), Blejer, Dunaway and Szapary (1991), Hussain and Stern  (1991),
Schmidt-Hebbel and Xu (1991).38
allowed to sell at market-determined prices the excess of output over the
quota delivered to the state agency.6 In 1986, the system of compulsory
remittance of profits to the central government was abolished and a corporate
income tax of 55 percent was instituted.  The rationale was to accept the
profit motive in the  behavior of public enterprises in order to promote
efficiency and decentralization.  As of 1991, around 50 percent of prices are
determined in unregulated markets  (Schmidt-Hebbel and Xu, 1991).  On other
fronts, "special economic zones" were created, mostly in the south of the
country near other East Asian markets.  In these "special economic zones",
particularly in the Guangdon and Fujian province, direct foreign investment,
oriented to export processing, receives special treatment for profit
remittances and tax obligations.  The basic aim of those special zones is to
attract foreign investment and expose segments of the economy to foreign
competition and get access to new technologies and markets."
In contrast with other experiences of economic reform the Chinese
process has evolved in a context of relative macroeconomic stability, albeit
punctuated by periods of inflationary acceleration following price reforms.
In particular, inflationary outbursts took place in 1980-81, 1985-87, and
1988-1989.  The most serious acceleration of inflation was in 1988-89 when the
retail price index rose to near 20 percent on an annual basis (see figure Sb).
Inflationary pressures were, in part, compressed: subsidies for consumer
agricultural goods increased from 0.3 percent of GDP in 1978 to around 4.0
percent in 1984.  As of 1991 the price subsidies on consumer goods still
represent around 1.5 percent of GNP  (Schmidt-Hebbel and Xu, 1991).  At the
macro level, the policy response to outbursts of inflation observed after the
periods of price reform have been one of tightening credit policy and
restraining wage increases in state owned enterprises.  In general the Chinese
36  see Schmidt-Hebbel and Xu (1991).
37  see Perkins  (1992).39
government seems to have a genuine distaste for inflation.3  Table 9 shows
that the fiscal deficit (central government) has been maintained at a
relatively modest level throughout the reform period, say around 2.0 percent
of GDP during 1978-1991.39 Moreover, it is interesting to note that fiscal
deficits tended to widen during the periods  of price reform.  In particular,
the share of subsidies on operating losses of state-owned enterprises
increased after 1986, as the enterprises sector moved towards greater
decentralization and away from forced profit remittances; in fact the share of
subsidies to state-owned enterprises went up from 1.3 percent of GNP in 1978-
85 to 3.5 percent of GNP, on average, in the period 1986-91 (Schmidt-Hebbel
and Xu, 1991).  Finally, on the external sector China enjoyed a relatively
comfortable position during the reform process with considerable levels of
international reserves  (as share of imports) and with moderate, though
increasing, levels of external debt (table 9).
The response of the Chinese economy to the reforms started in the late
seventies was impressive, in terms of output growth (see table 9 and figure
5a).  Average GDP was growing at 8.7 percent per year in the period 1978-1991.
In contrast, the rate of growth of national income in the period 1970-77 was
4.6 percent  (Hussain and Stern, 1991).  In the period 1978-91 GDP Per caoita
grew 7.3 percent per year with a similar trend in per-capita consumption;
clearly the standards of living of the population increased drastically over
the reform period; though they are still at a low level, as proxied by the
level of income per capita.
To summarize, the Chinese reform process has been gradual, conservative
in  macroeconomic terms and apparently it has preserved the gains in social
welfare and distribution achieved in the pre-reform period  (see Perkins,
1988).  In contrast with the recent experience of Eastern Europe, the economic
38  This may have historical roots as China experienced a virulent
hyperinflation in the late forties at the time of the revolution.
39  Unfortunately data on the quasi-fiscal deficit of the central bank is
not yet available for China.40
Table  9
China  --  Main  Economic  Indicators
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Inflation  Rate
Growth  Agriculture  (a)  (b)  Budget  International  ExternaL
rate,  GDP  output  GDP  Retail  Deficit  Reserves  Debt
(a)  (b)  (growth  rate  deflator  Price  Index  (percent  of  (months  of  (percent  of
Total  Per  Capita  percent)  (percent)  (percent)  GDP  imports)  GDP)
1971-77  4.6a  1.6  0.4
1978  12.3  3.4  0.7  -0.3  4.9  0.29
1979  7.2  5.8  6.4  3.6  2.0  5.2  6.7  0.85
1980  7.9  6.6  -1.8  4.0  6.0  3.3  6.1  1.51
1981  4.5  3.2  7.1  2.2  2.4  1.3  5.5  2.07
1982  8.7  7.1  11.7  0.1  1.9  1.4  10.7  3.05
1983  10.1  8.7  8.5  1.4  1.5  1.7  11.1  3.28
1984  14.5  13.2  13.0  4.6  2.8  1.6  9.3  4.04
1985  13.0  11.7  1.7  9.1  8.8  0.5  4.8  5.74
1986  8.4  7.1  3.7  4.6  6.0  1.9  4.6  8.45
1987  11.2  9.9  4.8  5.0  7.3  2.0  6.2  11.60
1988  10.8  9.5  3.2  11.5  18.5  2.6  5.2  11.27
1989  3.9  2.6  3.3  9.0  17.8  1.8  5.1  10.03
1990  4.9  3.6  6.9  4.9  2.1  1.5  7.7  14.40 1991  5.0  3.8  3.5  - 3.0  - 7.5  15.32
Average:
1978-1991  8.7  7.3  5.4  5.0c  5.8  1.9  6.8  6.6
Source:  World  Bank. Schmidt-Hebbel  and  Xu (1991)
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reforms in China have taken place without serious macroeconomic dislocation.
Nevertheless, the reforms are still partial: near half of the economy still
operates under controlled prices, and national wealth is almost completely in
the hands of the state.
8.  Summing-Up
Prior to summing-up the main findings of this paper, a caveat is in
order.  It is apparent from this review of experiences on reform that a
blueprint of universal validity, on "how to reform an economy" simply does not
exist, given the enormous country diversity in initial conditions, structural
features of the economy and political conditions that are bound to exist at
the start of a process of reform.  Broad generalizations on preferred policies
have necessarily to be complemented by a knowledge of the specific economic
conditions and the political realities of the country entering into a process
of reform.  Nevertheless, some broad generalizations are apparent, as
described below:
(i)  Reform Strategy: Shock versus Gradualism.  It is clear that the
choice between these two alternatives will be greatly influenced by two
elements:  the initial conditions (disequilibria) at the beginning of reform
and the political feasibility of carrying forward a certain program, besides
an analysis of costs and benefits (and its distribution over time) of each
course of action.  If the economy is in a macroeconomic crises with
accelerating inflation and severe balance of payments problems, comprehensive
macro restraint might be almost inescapable.  Eastern Europe after 1989 and
Russia 1992 are examples of that as well as the Latin American cases reviewed
in the paper.  On the contrary if reforms start from relatively balanced
macroeconomic conditions there is much more room for gradualism as the case of
China eloquently shows.
Regarding the political preconditions behind a program, shock treatment
requires a strong government with broad social support since the costs  of the43
policies are paid upfront and the benefits may take time to accrue.  However,
if the program brings along protracted social hardship (due to cuts in real
wages, unemployment, slow recovery of growth) the initial political support
may start evaporating and pressure will build up for an eventual reversal of
reforms (e.g., Poland in mid-1992).
(ii)  Macroeconomic Consolidation versus Rapid Liberalization.  This
issue is related to the former one though it is not the same.  Here, the issue
refers to the sequence between macroeconomic adjustment and consolidation and
structural reforms.  There are areas in which both set of policies reinforce
each other; conversely, there are other areas in which stabilization and
liberalization may enter in conflict.  On the one hand, implementing a tax
reform and the conversion of quotas to tariffs are policies that improve the
fiscal budget, thus they contribute to macroeconomic stabilization.
Conversely, premature financial liberalization before the budget is balanced,
and real interest rates are at a reasonable level may lead to a financial
crises, whose solution is fiscally costly and destabilizing, as it happened to
occur in Chile in 1982-83.
Massive privatization of large scale firms can have both stabilizing or
destabilizing macroeconomic effects.  On the one hand it may save the
government scarce resources if it implies getting rid of loss-making public
enterprises, in this case public finances improve with the ensuing
contribution to macro stabilization.  On the other hand, if privatization
involve massive liquidation of existing enterprises, the output and
unemployment costs of privatization may become socially unsustainable and thus
pressure will mount for the government to go in financial rescue of those
enterprises.  In this latter case the process of macroeconomic stabilization
will be hindered.
(iii) Price Reform and Inflation.  The shift from an economy with a vast
array of controlled prices to a system in which most prices are market-44
determined, in general involve (an  often large) hike in the price level.
Recent examples of this are the outbursts of inflation observed in most
economies of Eastern Europe during 1990-1991 and in Russia in early 1992,
following price decontrol, currency devaluation and adjustment in prices of
public utilities and energy.  Moreover, the initial price shock has been
followed by considerable inflationary persistence in Poland, Bulgaria and
Romania.  In non-socialist countries, inflationary persistence because of
monetary accommodation, indexation and credibility problems, is a well known
phenomena, particularly in chronic inflation economies of Latin America.  This
stubbornness of inflation is illustrated with the cases of Chile and Mexico,
where, after sustained application of stabilization programs, the convergence
to 20-25 percent annual inflation rates, starting from three digits levels,
took around 7 years.
(iv)  Patterns of Output, Investment and Export Response to Adjustment.
A contraction in aggregate economic activity of considerable magnitude was
observed after the implementation of shock programs, compounded by negative
external shocks, in several Latin American and Eastern European economies.
Comparatively, the degree of economic contraction in the post-socialist
transitions of Eastern Europe, is far deeper than in the adjusting Latin
American economies reviewed here.  In contrast, socialist China avoided that
pattern of initial contraction as GDP growth accelerated sharply in the
aftermath of gradual reform.
The recovery of capital formation and the resumption of sustainable
growth is often a slow and complicated process.  In Chile and Mexico it took
half a decade or so, to get a sustained response of private investment in the
aftermath of reform.  The response of domestic private capital formation in
Eastern Europe might be even longer giving the obvious supply problems and
institutional weakness of the post-socialist system.
In the Latin American context, Chile (and to a less extent Mexico and
Bolivia) experienced a strong expansion of non-traditional exports (though45
with a still modest intensity of value added) following the establishment of
competitive real exchange rates and lower import duties.  In Eastern Europe,
an initial expansion in exports to the west also took place in Poland and
other countries in response to large currency depreciation and declines in
domestic absorption.
(v)  Distributive Effects and the Costs of Adjustment.  The available
evidence for Chile and Mexico, suggest a worsening in income distribution in
initial years of reform as a consequence of cuts in real wages and/or
increases in unemployment.Those effects were meliorated for very low income
groups, receiving targeted social spending.  In Eastern Europe after 1989 real
wages have declined substantially (30 percent or so on average) and
unemployment is growing (around 11-12 percent) following the implementation of
adjustment programs.  The rise of unemployment in economies in which full
employment was an entitlement is bringing a sense of economic insecurity and
anxiety,new for people raised under socialism.  In addition, the Darwinian-
Schumpeterian process of economic differentiation under market systems is
bound to increase (through fair and unfair mechanisms)the degree of economic
inequality in these economies.
(vi)  Political Economy Considerations.  The sample of countries
reviewed here can be partitioned into two groups regarding the political
conditions under which economic reform is undertaken.  One group is formed by
countries that launched economic reform under authoritarian conditions.  This
is the case of Pinochet's Chile, China and Korea.  In these cases, economic
reforms were carried out by authoritarian governments that postponed political
reform in order to gain political legitimacy from the fruits of consolidated
economic reform.  A second group is formed by countries where economic reform
is conducted in (emergent) democracies.  This is the case of Eastern Europe
(and  Russia) in which reforms are pursued simultaneously in the political and
economic fronts.  As it could be anticipated, fragile democracies with a46
fragmented party system and weak social institutions and governments do not
provide the most favorable political environment for implementing and
consolidating complex and painful economic reforms.  Under these conditions,
governments are bound to face the difficult dilemma of either postponing
economic reform in order to avert a political crises or to backslide in the
democratization process in order to apply painful economic policies.
Certainly both are unsavory choices.47
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